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Recovering Delisting Returns of Hedge Funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Numerous hedge funds stop reporting to commercial databases each year. An issue for hedge-
fund performance estimation is: what delisting return to attribute to such funds? This would be 
particularly problematic if delisting returns are typically very different from continuing funds’ 
returns.  In this paper, we use estimated portfolio holdings for funds-of-funds with reported 
returns to back out maximum likelihood estimates for hedge-fund delisting returns.  The 
estimated mean delisting return for all exiting funds is small, although statistically significantly 
different from the average observed returns for all reporting hedge funds.  These findings are 
robust to relaxing several underlying assumptions. 
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Recovering Delisting Returns of Hedge Funds 
 
 Each year, a substantial percentage of hedge funds stop reporting their results to publicly 
available databases.  For example, the annual average “delisting” rate was  8.1%  in 
Morningstar’s ALTVEST database for January 1994 – June 2006 (the data used in this paper).1  
If one is studying hedge-fund performance, this raises the issue of what return should be 
attributed to such funds for the period when they stop reporting.  Typically, these funds are 
described as “dead funds”; but it is clear that not all of them have ceased to exist.  The 
information in ALTVEST is self-reported by the funds, with only  20%  of dead funds indicating 
they were being liquidated.  Indeed, another 4% indicate that they stopped providing their returns 
because they closed to further investments (potentially due to stellar performance and large 
previous inflows of investment capital).  Moreover, information for the remaining  76%  of 
delisted funds either does not indicate why they ceased reporting or provides non-informative 
statements such as “requested by manager”.  
 One possibility for addressing this issue is to simply drop the last period from the 
analysis, but that ignores the fact that fund investors will actually experience the delisting return.  
In contrast, Posthuma and van der Sluis (2004) used  0%,  -50%, and  -100%  to cover a wide 
range of possibilities for the unknown delisting return.  This drew a strong response from two 
practitioners, Van and Song (2005, p.7), who call the assumption of a delisting return of  -50%  
“outrageous”.  However, if a fund has suffered massive losses and is being liquidated, a large 
negative delisting return is definitely possible.  This would be the case if the fund’s mark-to-
market valuation prior to delisting underestimated the extent of losses that would be incurred 
with liquidation, presumably under adverse circumstances.  On the other hand, a highly 
successful fund that chooses to restrict further investment and focus on managing its current 
funds might well have a substantial positive (but unreported) delisting return.  Moreover, for the 
vast majority of funds, we do not know why they stop reporting.  
 There is a literature which explores hedge-fund performance prior to delisting.2  However, 
the only paper of which we are aware that makes any attempt to examine performance after 
delisting is Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999).  They used a combined data set with 
                                                 
1 In what follows, we will use the term “delist” to indicate that the fund has stopped reporting its results to database 
providers while other authors have also used the term “exit” instead.    
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underlying data from two providers, Managed Account Reports, Inc. (MAR) and Hedge Fund 
Research, Inc. (HFR).  During 1993-1995, their combined data included  37  “terminated” funds 
(liquidated, restructured, or merged into another fund) plus an additional  104  funds that stopped 
reporting without a clear indication as to why they ceased reporting. That is, a total of  141  
delisting funds.  Those authors were able to obtain information on returns for some fraction of the 
terminated funds (only) via a request to HFR regarding funds that had been listed in the HFR 
portion of the joint database.  Thus, the information refers to only a subset of the  37  terminated 
funds rather than all  141  delisting funds.  The response from HFR indicated an average return 
for the terminating funds after delisting of  -0.7%,  with a surprisingly rapid final redemption that 
occurred on average only  18  days after delisting.  It would appear that some of the terminating 
funds were in the process of liquidating while still reporting returns.  Unfortunately, that data is 
rather old (1993-1995), predating the boom in the hedge-fund industry; and it is based on a 
relatively small sample (at most  37  terminating funds).  Also, they do not report delisting return 
estimates for funds that did not provide a clear reason for delisting or for what would correspond 
in the ALTVEST database to being closed to further investment.  
 In this paper, we propose a methodology for estimating delisting returns based on a fund-
of-funds (FoF) being a portfolio of positions in individual hedge funds, some of which may stop 
reporting in any given period.  If we had information on the actual FoF portfolio positions, it 
would be straightforward to back out returns for delisting funds using that information plus the 
FoF returns and the returns of live hedge funds for the delisting month.  Unfortunately, we do not 
have that information on FoF portfolio positions.  Instead, we estimate those portfolio holdings 
through a matching algorithm related to principal component analysis.  Once we have inferred the 
portfolio holdings (positions in hedge funds) for each FoF in our sample, we can obtain delisting 
returns during the next period based on the difference between the observed next-period return 
for each FoF and that period’s return from its estimated portfolio holdings in live (still reporting) 
hedge funds. 
 Fung and Hsieh (2000) as well as Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008) have also 
noticed that FoF returns implicitly incorporate the delisting returns of individual hedge funds; 
however, they do not use the portfolio connection to actually back out the delisting returns.  
                                                                                                                                                              
2 See for example, Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999), ter Horst and Verbeek (2007), as well as Liang (2000).  
3 
 
Nevertheless, Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008, page 1778) do point out that the absence 
of delisting returns leads to a situation where a “fund-of-fund’s return more accurately reflects 
the losses experienced by investors in the underlying hedge fund (albeit indirectly).”   
 An issue with the matching algorithm is the potential for mismatches where the estimated 
FoF portfolio contains a different number of delisted funds than truly occurred for that FoF 
during the period.  We develop an adjustment to correct for this bias and report below estimates 
using that methodology.  We find different mean delisting returns for hedge funds that do not 
provide a clear reason for delisting as opposed to those that liquidate and those which state they 
are closed to further investment.  However, none of these estimates are large.  Across all delisting 
hedge funds, the estimated mean delisting return is  -1.86%.  This compares with a mean monthly 
return for all hedge funds in our sample of  1.01%.  Thus, we find that the estimated average 
delisting return is fairly small and nowhere near values of  -50%.  Nevertheless, some funds have 
large negative exit returns, which results in substantial variability of our estimated delisting 
returns.  
The next section provides details on the matching algorithm and the econometric model of 
FoF returns.   In Section II, we describe our empirical design and basic characteristics of the data 
sample.  Results are contained in Section III along with several robustness checks.  Section IV 
provides concluding comments. 
 
I. The Basic Model 
 Since we do not have precise information on portfolio holdings for each FoF in our 
sample, we need a procedure for estimating those holdings.  We use a matching algorithm based 
on the concept of principle components.  A somewhat similar problem has been encountered with 
empirical macroeconomic models in which a short time series needs to be explained by many 
potential predictors.3  The macroeconometric approach of aggregating many predictors (hedge 
funds in our case) into principle components is not directly applicable to our setting of FoF 
returns.  After all, each FoF invests into a relatively small number of individual hedge funds (the 
reported average for our data is  24) and not into principle components. However, we use a 
related idea which keeps the basic approach of principle components. 
                                                 
3 See e.g. Bai (2003), Bai and Ng (2002), Boivina and Ng (2006), plus Stock and Watson (2002). 
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As a preliminary step, we need to “gross up” the reported FoF returns to a pre-fee level – 
that is, to the return level before management and incentive fees were extracted by the FoF.   That 
pre-fee FoF return is the return on a portfolio of post-fee hedge fund returns (management and 
incentive fees having already been extracted by the respective hedge funds).  As our FoF and 
hedge-fund return data is all post-fee, we transform the FoF returns to a pre-fee basis using an 
algorithm closely related to Brooks, Clare, and Motson (2007) that is described in the Appendix. 
 In our implementation, we use a 36-month rolling window and consider only FoFs and 
hedge funds which report returns for all months in the relevant window. As with many other 
implementation choices for our basic methodology, we have examined the robustness of our 
estimates to variations in the choice of a 36-month window.  To avoid cluttering the exposition, 
we defer discussion of most such robustness checks until Section III below.  As a general 
statement, our qualitative results are quite robust; but there can be some variation in point 
estimates and significance tests.   
 For each FoF, we find the hedge fund whose (post-fee) returns are most highly correlated 
with the (pre-fee) returns of that FoF.  Then, we regress the FoF returns on the chosen hedge fund 
and obtain the residual returns. Next, we find a second hedge fund that is now the most highly 
correlated with the residual returns for that FoF.  We add that hedge fund to the portfolio, find 
new residual returns, and proceed in this fashion until we have  15  hedge funds in the portfolio.  
We provide a detailed description of the methodology in the next section.   
 Once we work out the set of matched hedge funds for each FoF, we are ready to model the 
pre-fee returns of the FoF as a portfolio of the (post-fee) returns on the matched hedge funds.  
The (pre-fee) FoF returns are always indicated with an upper-case R, and the live hedge fund 
returns (post-fee) are denoted with a lower-case rL.  We use  T = 36  consecutive returns to 
estimate the following regression model for each FoF, with funds indexed by  i  and time periods 
(months) by t: 
 
2
min
[ ] ,    1,..., ,    (0, )
s.t.:   0.25 ,    1 1
it Lt i it it i
i i
R r t T N εβ ε ε σ
β β β⊥
= + =
≥ ≥ =
∼
    (1) 
 
In order to insure economically sensible portfolio positions, we restrict the loadings  βi  
(portfolio weights for FoFi) on the matched hedge funds to be smaller than  0.25  and larger than 
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some minimal value  βmin.  We further assume that each FoF is fully invested in its set of matched 
hedge funds.4   
Logically, equation (1) should not include a constant term since we do not have an 
investable asset with a constant return.  One might anticipate that a FoF would have an 
approximately constant component in its operation costs; however, we assume operating costs are 
effectively paid out of the Fund’s management fee and hence do not appear in equation (1).  
Some  70%  of FoF in our data report not using leverage on average.  Apparently, most FoFs also 
attempt to remain close to fully invested.  Hence, we do not include the riskless asset as one of 
the investments for our primary implementation of equation (1).  However, we do include in our 
analysis FoFs which indicate average borrowing up to  100%  (200%)  of their equity.  Those 
funds represent some  20%  and  5%,  respectively, of all FoFs in our data.  For such FoFs, we 
allow investment into the riskless asset with  0 1   (respectively 2)risklessβ≥ ≥ − ≥ − .  We use 
monthly returns based on 3-month T-bills from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15 as a 
riskless rate.  In those implementations, the upper limit on  βi  changes then from  0.25  to  0.5  or 
to  0.75,  respectively.   
We now turn to the fitted return of the FoF in period  T+1.   If all the hedge funds in that 
particular FoF portfolio are still alive, then the fitted return is simply calculated using the 
estimated portfolio weights from equation (1) with the observed returns of the matched hedge 
funds for period  T+1: 
 
, 1 , 1
ˆˆ [ ]i T L T iR r β+ +=       (2) 
 
 Now consider the situation where a hedge fund delists and does not report its return for 
that period.  We denote that unreported return as  rE,T+1.  The econometrics and computations turn 
out to be much simpler if we base our estimates on matched portfolios where there is a single 
                                                 
4 There is an omitted variables problem in that a given FoF may be invested in one or more hedge funds that are not 
in our database.  ALTVEST is not all-encompassing; and indeed, there are hedge funds that do not report to any of 
the publicly available databases.  Our procedure assumes that we can implicitly approximate the omitted funds by a 
linear combination of hedge funds that are in our database. Simulation studies discussed in Section II below indicate 
our methodology works adequately, even with a large number of omitted funds.  A similar argument can be used 
concerning turnover in the fund of funds.  As long as there is a reasonably similar hedge fund which mimics the time-
varying true holdings of the FoF, our method will adequately match the performance for that FoF.  
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delisting hedge fund.  That situation represents approximately  88%  of our matched sample.  
Note that with one delisting fund in the portfolio, the vector of live returns  rL,T+1  will be one 
shorter than in the above situation where all hedge funds for a given FoF portfolio are alive in 
period  T+1.  We model the unobserved delisting return  rE,T+1  as being normally distributed with 
mean   μE  and standard deviation  σΕ.  In period  T+1,  a FoF with a (single) delisting hedge fund 
in its portfolio, will have an actual return that can be expressed as: 
 
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1[ , ]i T L T E T i i TR r r β ε+ + + += +      (3) 
 
where we treat the  FoFi  replication error  εi  as uncorrelated with estimated delisting returns.5 
 We approximate the true betas with the estimated betas and the variances of the residuals 
with their estimated values.  For support of such assumptions, see the simulations and robustness 
checks in Section III below.  The above approach leads to the following normally distributed 
quantity: 
 
2 2 2
, 1 , 1 , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( , )i T L T L i E i E E i E iR r N εβ β μ β σ σ+ +− +∼ ,    (4) 
 
where  ,ˆL iβ   and  ,ˆE iβ   are the estimated betas respectively for the hedge funds staying alive and 
those exiting in period  T+1  in the matched portfolio of  FoFi. 
When calculating the log-likelihood, we pay attention to the fact that several FoFs can 
invest into the same hedge fund.  If that hedge fund delists, then the associated delisting return  
rE,T+1  will be the same for all FoFs with that hedge fund in their portfolio.  Thus, we add up the 
relevant equations (3) while keeping the  rE,T+1  constant in that case.  Not doing so biased  σΕ  
upward in unreported simulations.  
The above procedure delivers an unbiased estimate of the mean exit return  µE  if all 
matched portfolios used for the analysis have the number of delisted funds correctly identified. 
That is, if a FoF truly invests into  k  delisted hedge funds, then the corresponding matching 
portfolio should also have exactly  k  delisted funds.  Our procedure does not require precise 
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hedge fund identification, and the returns of the truly delisted funds can be proxied by returns of 
different (but correlated) funds in the matching portfolio. The estimate of  µE  stays unbiased as 
long as the number of identified delisted hedge funds coincides with the number of truly delisted 
funds.  However, one cannot guarantee this correspondence while constructing the matching 
portfolios; and the resulting estimate of  µE   can be biased.   
Since we use only matches that have exactly one delisted fund, the following biases can 
occur.  First, consider a FoF that does not invest into any delisted fund, but the estimated 
matching portfolio erroneously has a delisted fund.  Using this match, one would estimate not an 
unobserved delisting return (on average µE ) but the return of a hedge fund that was still alive. 
The higher the share of matches of this type, the more the estimate of  µE  will be biased towards 
the average return of hedge funds that were reporting to the database during that period, which 
we denote by  µHF.  Second, if a FoF truly invests into one delisted hedge fund and the estimated 
matching portfolio also has one delisted fund, then the match has perfect correspondence and 
does not bias the estimate of  µE. Third, consider a FoF that actually has investments in two or 
more hedge funds that delist but is matched with a portfolio having only one delisted fund. 
Trying to compensate for this mismatch would tend to impart an upward bias in the estimated 
absolute value of  µE.  For example, if the number of truly delisted funds is two, one would obtain 
an average estimate of  µE + (µE - µHF)  instead of  µE.  Our adjustment procedure does not 
consider cases with three or more truly delisting hedge funds since the probability of such a 
situation is very low for a FoF portfolio invested in  15  hedge funds.  According to our 
simulations described below, the probability that a FoF has  3  or more exiting hedge funds while 
being matched with only one exiting fund is less than one percent. 
The biases due to such mismatches can be corrected, if one knows the share of matches 
for each type.  Let us denote by  pk  the probability that a FoF truly invests into  k  delisted funds, 
and the estimated matching portfolio indicates the existence of only one delisted fund. Then the 
estimated biased delisting return  µEEstimated  is a weighted average of the unbiased estimate  
µEUnbiased  and the average return of a hedge funds in the database  µHF.6  That is: 
                                                                                                                                                              
5 Changing the correlation coefficient to  0.5  or  -0.5  does  not qualitatively change the results, with only small 
changes in the estimated numerical values.  
6 In our adjustment, we use the average monthly return of all hedge funds in the sample.  This will include funds that 
were alive during a portion of the 1994 – June 2006 period but eventually died and are thus included in the dead 
funds portion of the database as of June 2006.  
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 ( ) ( )0 1 0 11 2Estimated Unbiased UnbiasedE HF E E HFp p p pμ μ μ μ μ= ⋅ + ⋅ + − − ⋅ −  (5) 
 
and we can solve for  µEUnbiased : 
 
( )0 1 0 1(2 1) 2 2Unbiased EstimatedE E HFp p p pμ μ μ⎡ ⎤= − + − ⋅ − −⎣ ⎦    (6) 
 
The probabilities  pk  are not known but can be estimated using a simulation procedure 
which is described in the next section.  
 
II. Data Characteristics and Implementation 
 We begin this section with a description of the data before proceeding to a discussion of 
our bootstrap procedure for estimating standard errors.  Finally, we describe our adjustment for 
the bias induced by potential mismatches regarding the number of delisting funds in a FoF 
portfolio. 
 
A.  The Data 
We use the ALTVEST database which contains  6827  reporting funds during the January 
1994 – June 2006 period.  Those funds are classified into dead and live hedge funds plus dead 
and live FoFs.  We only use funds that report in US dollars and exclude  36  dead funds that were 
removed from the live database because of duplicate registration.  This leaves us with  6169  total 
funds, of which  4873  are hedge funds and  1296  are FoFs.  Panel A of Table 1 reports 
descriptive statistics for those funds.  A fund being designated as live or dead in that table refers 
to its status as of June 2006.  Note that the monthly returns are post-fee for both hedge funds and 
FoF in Panel A, just as they are reported in the database.   
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
The table reports descriptive statistics for funds reporting to the ALTVEST database.  Panel A is 
based on all funds reporting in US dollars during January 1994 - June 2006.  Panel B is based on 
the funds used in our analysis, after we dropped the first 12 observations for all hedge funds and 
eliminated any funds that did not have at least 36 consecutive remaining observations.  Return 
statistics are across funds and based on monthly returns. Note that all returns in Panel A are post-
fee.  In Panel B, the FoF returns are grossed up to a pre-fee basis, while the hedge-fund returns 
remain post-fee.  All values except Number of Funds are averages of the statistics. 
 
 
Panel A 
 
  Hedge Funds, post-fee Funds of Funds, post-fee 
  All Live Dead All Live Dead 
Number 4873 2130 2743 1296 886 410 
Life Time in Years 4.67 5.60 3.94 4.80 5.12 4.10 
Mean 1.05 1.13 1.00 0.66 0.68 0.61 
Median 0.90 1.01 0.82 0.69 0.74 0.59 
STD 4.36 3.58 4.98 2.12 1.75 2.92 
Min -9.65 -8.27 -10.72 -4.79 -3.90 -6.72 
Max 13.05 11.93 13.92 6.16 5.10 8.45 
Skewness 0.09 0.16 0.03 -0.11 -0.15 -0.04 
Kurtosis 5.29 5.38 5.22 4.65 4.44 5.12 
Sharpe Ratio 0.25 0.32 0.19 0.29 0.33 0.22 
  
 
Panel B 
 
  Hedge Funds, post-fee Funds of Funds, pre-fee 
  All Live Dead All Live Dead 
Number 2496 1290 1206 759 540 219 
Life Time in Years 6.40 7.08 5.67 6.79 7.12 5.98 
Mean 1.01 1.05 0.97 0.84 0.85 0.80 
Median 0.88 0.94 0.81 0.81 0.86 0.71 
STD 4.32 3.83 4.85 2.17 1.81 3.06 
Min -11.21 -10.06 -12.45 -5.65 -4.70 -8.01 
Max 14.65 13.56 15.81 7.56 6.34 10.55 
Skewness 0.06 0.12 -0.01 -0.06 -0.13 0.10 
Kurtosis 6.18 6.01 6.37 5.64 5.39 6.26 
Sharpe Ratio 0.24 0.29 0.19 0.37 0.41 0.26 
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 We eliminate the first 12 returns for each hedge fund in order to mitigate backfill bias. 
Our matching procedure requires funds which report returns for at least 36 consecutive months, 
and we eliminate all funds which do not satisfy that requirement (after deleting the first 12 
monthly returns for hedge funds).  We also exclude FoFs which indicate they are highly levered, 
defined as average borrowings exceeding  200%  of their equity capital.  This reduces our sample 
of FoFs by  5.12%.  Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the remaining funds.  We 
have  2496  hedge funds, of which  1206  delisted (stopped reporting) at some time prior to the 
end of June 2006 and are thus classified as dead funds.  We are not focusing on hedge fund style; 
however, our data contains a good representation of several styles with equity long/short  (43%), 
directional  (20%), relative value  (23%), and event driven  (14%).  Among the  759  FoFs,  540  
are classified as live funds; however, we can still use the  219  dead FoFs for windows of time 
when they were alive. For the FoF statistics in Panel B, we now report pre-fee returns computed 
using the algorithm described in the Appendix.  We use the reported fee structure with that 
algorithm; however, as a point of information, the typical FoF in our data charges a management 
fee of  1%  and an incentive fee of  10%  per year. 
 
B.  Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
Theoretical standard errors for our analysis would be problematic due to assumptions that 
the true beta is equal to the estimated beta and that the residuals are normally distributed.  These 
assumptions might well be violated.  Moreover, the different FoF matches will typically have 
overlapping time series.  Because of these issues, we use a bootstrap approach to estimate 
standard errors.  In particular, we utilize a two-stage procedure that bootstraps over the matches 
and also over the returns in each match.  For the first stage, we use our matched portfolios where 
each match is a sequence of  37  returns for the relevant FoF complete with the respective 
matched portfolio of hedge funds.  We randomly draw with replacement the same number of 
matched portfolios to constitute a bootstrapped set.  For the second stage, we also bootstrap from 
the monthly return vectors within each match.  That is, we resample by time-slice (keeping the 
actual returns aligned by month) the  36  months of FoF and matched hedge fund returns. This, 
allows re-estimated portfolio weights to differ in the bootstrap procedure.  We obtain parameter 
estimates for  μE  and  σΕ  via maximum likelihood.  Finally, we use our bias correction to obtain 
unbiased estimates for  µE  and  σΕ.  We repeat this exercise  1,000  times to obtain bootstrapped 
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standard errors which allow for estimation error in the portfolio weights, non-normal residuals, 
overlapping time series, and small sample effects. 
 
C.  Adjusting for the Potential Mismatch Bias 
Since the probabilities  pk  are not known, we estimate them using simulation. First, we 
construct hypothetical FoFs from existing hedge funds. We randomly draw without replacement a 
hedge fund and its vector of consecutive returns from the hedge fund database.  If that hedge fund 
remains alive, it will have a vector of  37  consecutive returns.  If it is a delisting fund, the vector 
will have  36  consecutive returns with delisting occurring in month  37.  We construct  500  FoFs 
each consisting of  15  such randomly drawn hedge funds and flag which funds in a simulated 
FoF actually delisted.  The portfolio weights are uniformly and randomly selected in the interval  
0.02  to  0.07  and normalized to sum to one.  We then move forward six months in time and 
repeat this exercise, continuing in this manner until we cover the complete time frame of 
available data.  We next employ our usual matching procedure.  Based on those estimated 
matches, we compute the frequencies for matches in which one estimated delisting fund (using 
our matching procedure) corresponds to  0,  1,  2, and  3  or more true exits in the simulated FoFs. 
We repeat the complete simulation  100  times, and compute the estimated probabilities  pk  as 
averages of the corresponding frequencies. Table 2 below reports the characteristics of the 
estimated probabilities. 
  
Table 2: Estimated Probabilities for Mismatches of Different Types 
 
The table reports the estimated probabilities, via simulation, that the true FoF invests into  0,  1,  
2, and  3  or more delisting hedge funds when the estimated matching portfolio includes exactly 
one delisting hedge fund.  
 
 
Number of delisted 
funds in true FoF (k) 
0 1 2 3  or more 
Mean Probability (%) 63.48 29.67 5.94 0.91 
STD Probability (%) 1.02 1.00 0.45 0.19 
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 The standard deviations of the simulated probabilities are rather small, and we use the 
mean probability values for the bias correction. 
 We investigate the quality of our matching algorithm by constructing hypothetical FoFs 
returns from live hedge fund returns.  The procedure here is almost identical to that employed for 
estimating the probability of a mismatch regarding the number of exiting hedge funds in a FoF 
portfolio.  The only difference is, that for delisting hedge funds, we introduce a fictitious delisting 
return drawn from a Normal distribution with mean  -50%  or  -10%  and a respective standard 
deviation of  10%  or  3%.  We again construct  500  FoFs  and repeat this exercise for another 
eighteen sets of 500 FoFs, each time moving forward by six months and then drawing hedge fund 
return vectors.  We finally employ our usual estimation procedure to back out the mean delisting 
returns.   
In implementing this test, we also explore the issue that our database does not contain all 
hedge funds.  We do this by separating the hedge funds in our database into a “visible” set and an 
“invisible” set before generating the hypothetical FoF returns.  That is, we split the database so 
that only a fraction (100%,  67%,  or just  33%) of the total hedge funds will later be visible to 
our matching algorithm.  For example, suppose we split the total so that  67%  of the hedge funds 
are in the visible set and another  33%  are invisible.  We then generate each hypothetical FoF 
return by randomly drawing 10 hedge funds from the visible set and 5 funds from the invisible 
set.  However when we implement the matching algorithm, it is only allowed to search for 
matches within the visible set.  The estimated mean delisting returns with this approach are 
reported in Table 3 both with and without the bias correction for mismatches.  The simulations 
indicate the bias correction is not perfect but has an important impact, moving the estimated 
delisting return from   -20.30%  to  -48.13%  in the case of a true  -50%  delisting return with all 
hedge funds in the visible set.  Similarly in the case of a true mean delisting return of  -10%,  our 
bias correction moves the estimated mean from  -4.17%  to  -10.92%.   
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Table 3: Simulated Performance Results 
The table reports the average delisting return and their standard deviations as well as the 
bootstrapped standard deviations of the mean delisting return for simulated samples of FoF 
returns.  Each FoF is modeled as a portfolio of  15  individual hedge funds.  For simulated 
delisting funds, the hypothetical delisting return is drawn from a normal distribution with given 
mean (μE) and standard deviation (σE), expressed in percent per month. The reported estimates 
are obtained using our standard procedure with a subset of the hedge funds used to generate the 
FoF returns being visible to our matching algorithm. We vary the fraction of visible funds using  
100%,  67%,  and  33%  of the total generating set. We consider two possible delisting return 
distributions for hedge funds, characterized by pairs (μE, σE) of  (-50,  10)  and  (-10,  3).  Values 
are in % per month for the unbiased results and in parentheses for the biased, estimated results. 
 
 
Number of 
Visible Funds 
Number of 
Matches 
Mean Delisting 
Return 
Bootstrapped 
STD of Mean 
Delisting Return 
STD of 
Delisting 
Return 
(μE, σE) = (-50,10) 
15 176 -48.13 (-20.30) 4.57 (1.98) 23.70 
10 175 -47.20 (-19.87) 4.29 (1.86) 21.70 
5 171 -35.74 (-14.93) 3.87 (1.68) 20.10 
(μE, σE) = (-10,3) 
15 172  -10.92 (-4.17) 1.60 (0.69)  6.90 
10 174  -9.50 (-3.55) 1.38 (0.60)  6.10 
5 172  -7.09 (-2.50)  1.71 (0.74)  6.30 
 
 
In situations where some of the hedge funds held by the simulated FoFs are not in the 
visible data, our methodology underestimates the absolute value of the delisting return.  This is 
due to the algorithm not finding delisting hedge funds that are invisible (hidden) and instead 
erroneously including a live fund in the match.  This is analogous to the mismatch problem 
described above and again biases the estimated mean delisting return toward the average monthly 
return for all hedge funds.  Since we do not know the extent of delisting funds that are not in the 
ALTVEST database but are nonetheless held by our FoFs, we cannot adjust for that bias.   
Nevertheless, the results in Table 3 indicate that our procedure does recover most of the 
simulated mean delisting return (-50%  or  -10%  respectively in the upper and lower panels) 
even under the worst case scenario when only  33%  of hedge funds in which FoFs invest are 
visible.  Thus, we are rather confident that our procedure would not miss a large and negative 
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mean delisting return even if the database only contained a modest fraction of the hedge fund 
universe. 
 We recognize the possibility that a FoF alters its portfolio over time rather than holding it 
constant for  36  months.  Such turnover behavior has implications for our methodology that are 
similar to a hedge fund not being included in the database.  That is, our algorithm will tend to 
include spurious hedge funds in the estimated matches in an attempt to mimic the true time-
varying holdings of the FoF.  To examine potential implications of this problem, we implemented 
a simulation using a monthly turnover rate for all FoFs of  1.8%  (equivalent to  20%  annually, 
which would correspond to roughly half of each FoF portfolio over a three-year period).  As with 
invisible funds, this leads to our methodology underestimating the magnitude of the true 
simulated delisting return.  Nevertheless, we recovered between  70%  and  84%  of the correct 
value.  This suggests that our results reported below may be modest underestimates if FoF 
turnover is that substantial.  If actual turnover across all FoFs is less than the simulated  20%  
annual rate, then the effect of this estimation issue will be lessened.  In any case, even if the 
described problem changed the magnitude of our estimates by as much as  30%,  it would not 
change the qualitative results.     
 
III. Results 
 In this section, we first describe our main results and then discuss several robustness tests 
conducted to validate our results. 
 
A. Main Results  
In Table 4, we present results based on FoF matches where the adjusted R-squared in 
implementing equation (1) is at least  50%.7  We also provide the estimated standard deviation  
σΕ  of the delisting returns as well as bootstrapped standard errors for our estimated mean 
delisting returns.  For the set of all delisting hedge funds, we find an estimated average monthly 
delisting return (bias-corrected) of  -1.86%.  Based on the self-reported reason for delisting, we 
                                                 
7 Using cut-off values of  25%  or  75%  does  not qualitatively change the results, with only small changes in the 
estimated numerical values. 
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find that funds stating they were liquidated had a delisting return of  2.34%.8   Funds that stopped 
reporting due to being closed for further investment had a delisting return of  1.99%.  Finally, 
funds that did not clearly state a reason for no longer reporting had a mean delisting return of  -
3.27%.  Using p-values based on the bootstrapped distribution for delisting returns indicates that 
the estimated mean delisting returns for the categories All and No Reason are significantly 
different from the average return for all funds of 1.01% (see Panel B of Table 1).9  Both 
Liquidated and Closed categories have estimated mean delisting returns that are not significantly 
different from the  1.01%  average return for all funds in the database.10        
This provides rather strong evidence that on average, delisting returns are far from 
disaster scenarios with exit returns of  -50%  or worse.  Since the average delisting return is 
significantly different from all funds, it would be reasonable to base performance estimates on a 
small negative assumed delisting return like  -1,86%.  Note that simply ignoring the delisting 
fund would over-weight the remaining live funds and bias the performance estimate slightly 
upward.  Nevertheless, that bias is not likely to be serious in most applications. 
The maximum likelihood estimate for the standard deviation of all delisting returns,  
7.70%, is considerably higher than the average standard deviation of 3.83% for all hedge fund 
returns (in Table 1, Panel B).  This difference is due to the maximum likelihood estimate also 
capturing possible portfolio mismatches and estimation errors.   
                                                 
8 This is broadly in line with the findings of Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) who report a small, 
albeit negative, mean delisting return of  -0.7% for terminated funds (which corresponds approximately to our 
liquidated funds category). 
9 Recall that the categorization of live versus dead in Table 1 refers to a fund’s status as of June 2006.  Hence it 
seems appropriate to make a comparison with the mean return for all funds (1.01%) which refers to monthly returns 
when funds were alive. Using the average return on live funds (1.05%) or on dead funds (0.97%) hardly changes the 
results, as the average return differences are very minor. 
10 We explored whether partitioning the sample based on reported style or fee structure had an economically 
important effect on estimated mean delisting returns.  However, the reduced sample size in each category led to 
inconclusive results.  
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Table 4: Mean Delisting Returns 
We report the monthly delisting returns (bias-corrected) for FoFs where the adjusted R-squared 
of the main regression model is at least  50%. Values are in % per month.  
 
 
  Number of Matches 
Mean 
Delisting 
Return 
Bootstrapped 
STD of Mean 
Delisting 
Return 
Non-parametric       
p-value for 
difference with 1.01 
STD of 
Delisting 
Return 
All  986  ‐1.86  1.06  0.00  7.70 
Liquidated 160  2.34  1.76  0.20  5.20 
Closed 36  1.99  4.03  0.29  4.40 
No Reason 790  ‐3.27  1.28  0.00  8.60 
 
 
B. Robustness Tests 
 To assess the stability of our results, we implement our procedure using variations on our 
basic methodology.  Most resulting changes relative to the estimated mean delisting returns in 
Table 4 are within one bootstrapped standard deviation (using the Table 4 values) of the original 
estimate.  We interpret such changes as minor and discuss more substantial changes below.   
 To begin, we examine accuracy for the matching algorithm and estimated portfolio 
weights by comparing the forecast FoF portfolio return in the  37th  month with the actual FoF 
return in those matches where we have no delisting funds (consequently, having a full set of 
returns for the  37th month).  Our average forecast error is only  0.054%.   
 We conduct a set of runs which test for potential problems with the residuals of our main 
regression model in equation (1).  First, we use only FoFs where a Jarque-Bera test for normality 
of the residuals cannot be rejected.  Second, we use only those FoF returns where a Breusch-
Pagan test for no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected.  Third, we use only FoF returns where a 
Ljung-Box test for no first order serial correlation cannot be rejected.  Fourth, we use only FoF 
returns where the average residuals  εi,t  are not significantly different from zero.  In Table 5, we 
report the results for matched portfolios that satisfy the joint restriction that no rejection at the  
10%  significance level is allowed for any of the four tests regarding that particular match.  The 
general picture remains much the same as in our main results from Table 4; however, 
bootstrapped standard deviations are larger due to reduced sample sizes.  Note that the mean 
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delisting returns for both the Liquidated and the Closed categories declined by more than one 
bootstrapped standard deviation.  However, these mean estimates are not significantly different in 
either table from the average monthly return for all hedge funds.  Moreover, we are following the 
relatively conservative approach of using the Table 4 bootstrapped standard errors which are 
substantially smaller than those in Table 5. 
  
Table 5: Mean Delisting Returns for Well-Behaved Residuals 
We report the monthly mean delisting returns (bias-corrected) for FoFs where the adjusted R-
squared of the main regression model is at least  50%.  We also only use those FoFs where the 
residuals from regressions on the model in equation (1) do not reject the following four 
restrictions at the  10%  significance level: normally distributed, homoskedastic, no first-order 
autocorrelation, and zero average residuals.  Values are in % per month. 
 
 
  Number of 
Matches 
Mean 
Delisting 
Return 
Bootstrapped 
STD of Mean 
Delisting 
Return 
Non-parametric      
p-value for 
difference with 1.01 
STD of 
Delisting 
Return 
All  694  ‐2.98  1.71 0.01 11.10 
Liquidated 122  ‐0.10  2.74 0.44 6.20 
Closed 28  ‐4.58  7.60  0.26  10.70 
No Reason 544  ‐3.56  2.06  0.01  12.50 
 
 
 In Table 6, we report estimates which allow FoFs that report having no average leverage 
to have borrowing or lending positions of up to  10%  of their portfolio value.  Several of the 
estimated mean delisting returns in Panel A of Table 6 are substantially higher than their 
counterparts in Table 4.  The largest move using bootstrapped standard deviations (from Table 4) 
is the Liquidated category which increased by  2.15  bootstrapped standard deviations.  Note than 
when we switch to estimates with well-behaved residuals in Panel B, Table 6, the extent of 
increase for these estimated means is reduced.  Table 6 illustrates one of the few robustness 
checks where we have relatively large changes in estimated mean delisting returns, on the order 
of two bootstrapped standard deviations.  Nevertheless, the resulting estimates remain relatively 
small in the sense of being far from  -50%  or even  -10%.   
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Table 6: Mean Delisting Returns with Investment in the Riskless Asset 
In Panel A, we report the monthly mean delisting returns (bias-corrected) when an investment in 
the riskless asset of up to 0.1 in absolute terms is allowed.  We only use FoFs where the adjusted 
R-squared of the main regression model is at least  50%. Values are in % per month. In Panel B, 
we only use those FoFs where the residuals from regressions on the model in equation (1) do not 
reject the following four restrictions at the  10%  significance level: normally distributed, 
homoskedastic, no first-order autocorrelation, and zero average residuals.   
 
 
  Number of 
Matches 
Mean 
Delisting 
Return 
Bootstrapped 
STD of Mean 
Delisting 
Return 
Non-parametric      
p-value for 
difference with 1.01 
STD of 
Delisting 
Return 
   Panel A: All Matches
All  1001  0.20  0.91  0.12  8.10 
Liquidated 165  6.12  1.58  0.00  6.10 
Closed 35  ‐1.05  4.25  0.33  10.20 
No Reason 801  ‐1.41  1.09  0.01  8.50 
   Panel B: Matches with Well‐Behaved Residuals 
All  726  ‐0.96  1.29  0.10  9.90 
Liquidated 118  4.62  2.07  0.01  6.50 
Closed 28  ‐2.19  6.63  0.40  13.20 
No Reason 580  ‐2.53  1.56  0.04  10.60 
 
 
 Table 7 provides results obtained when we run our estimation procedure excluding FOFs 
that report having non-zero average leverage positions.  Again we have several estimated mean 
delisting returns in panel A of that table which have increased by somewhat more than one 
standard deviation relative to their counterparts in Table 4.  However, once again, the situation 
with well-behaved residuals is much less pronounced.  Moreover, the estimated means remain 
relatively small.  In an additional robustness test, we allowed for a constant in Equation (1) and 
obtained mean delisting return estimates similar to those in Table 4.   
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Table 7: Mean Delisting Returns without Leverage 
In Panel A, we report the monthly mean delisting returns (bias-corrected) for FoFs that report no 
average leverage.  We only use FoFs where the adjusted R-squared of the main regression model 
is at least  50%. Values are in % per month. In Panel B, we only use those FoFs where the 
residuals from regressions on the model in equation (1) do not reject the following four 
restrictions at the  10%  significance level: normally distributed, homoskedastic, no first-order 
autocorrelation, and zero average residuals.   
 
 
  Number of 
Matches 
Mean 
Delisting 
Return 
Bootstrapped 
STD of Mean 
Delisting 
Return 
Non-parametric     
p-value for 
difference with 
1.01 
STD of 
Delisting 
Return 
   Panel A: All Matches 
All  900  ‐0.32 1.22 0.20 9.30 
Liquidated 144  5.52 2.45 0.04 6.40 
Closed 31  1.03  4.88  0.50  4.90 
No Reason 725  ‐1.65 1.43 0.07 10.10 
   Panel B: Matches with Well‐Behaved Residuals 
All  613  ‐1.93 1.78 0.03 11.70 
Liquidated 106  3.32 2.96 0.14 6.80 
Closed 21  3.17  6.48  0.50  8.10 
No Reason 486  ‐3.48  2.09  0.01  13.10 
 
 
 We further ran estimates using a rolling window of  24  months, which generated larger 
mean delisting returns than in Table 4;  the largest (Closed category) was 5.73%.  However, 
estimating  15  portfolio weights using only  24  months of data caused us to have little 
confidence in these particular results.  There is a potential issue that hedge funds can revise their 
reported returns when they later find errors (e.g. due to an audit).  We re-ran our analysis after 
eliminating the last  6  months of the overall sample and found a mean delisting return for Closed 
funds of       -4.02%;  however, that estimate was based on only  23  matches. 
 When estimating matched portfolios, we allowed the algorithm to stop with fewer than  15  
funds as long as any fund would have an estimated weight of less than  0.02.  The resulting 
estimated mean delisting returns were similar to Table 4 except for the Closed category, which 
increased by 1.28  bootstrapped standard deviations to  7.16%.  Altering the constraint on the 
minimum portfolio weight from  0.02  to  0.04  did not change the estimated means by more than 
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one standard deviation from the means in Table 4.  Reducing that minimum beta constraint to  
0.01  had a similar effect, except that the estimated mean delisting return for the Closed category 
increased by  1.28  bootstrapped standards deviations to  6.88%. 
 To address the concern that small funds might not be realistic targets for FoFs, we 
eliminated all funds with assets under management of less than  $20  million at the beginning of 
relevant  36-month estimation period and obtained similar mean delisting returns to those in 
Table 4.   
  
IV. Concluding Comments 
 Relatively little has been known about returns after hedge funds delist from a database. 
Only Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) provided an estimate which even partially 
addressed this issue.  We examine the situation by modeling the econometric relationship 
between FoFs and the portfolios of hedge funds into which they invest. This structure allows us 
to estimate the average delisting return which turns out to be  -1.86%  per month for all delisting 
hedge funds.  That figure is significantly smaller than the average hedge fund return of  1.01%  
but much higher than disaster scenarios with large negative returns such as  -50%.  When we 
condition on the self-reported reason for delisting, we find average delisting returns of  2.34%  
for liquidated hedge funds,  1.99%  for hedge funds that indicate that they are closed to further 
investments, and           -3.27%  for the remaining  76%  of delisting funds that did not provide an 
informative reason for delisting.  Overall, our results indicate that average delisting returns are 
economically small. Moreover, this finding is robust with respect to several tests concerning the 
methodology and the selection of funds. 
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Appendix: Pre-fee Return Calculation 
 FoFs report their returns net of all fees.  In order to reconstruct the pre-fee returns for 
FoFs, we use a slightly modified version of the algorithm developed by Brooks, Clare, and 
Motson (2007).  The incentive fee is normally paid annually, but the reported monthly returns are 
adjusted for the accrued incentive fee during the year.  In other words, the accrued incentive fee 
is deducted when calculating a hedge fund’s reported Net Asset Value  (NAV); but that accrued 
fee stays invested with the fund until year end.  In most cases, the management fee is paid at the 
end of each month at  1/12  of the yearly rate.  The management fee calculation uses NAV on the 
last day of each month before deduction of that month’s accrued incentive fee.  The modification 
we made relative to Brooks, Clare, and Motson (2007) involves using the end of month (rather 
than beginning of month)  NAV  to calculate the management fee.  That change was based on our 
review of several hedge-fund prospectuses that indicated this was the typical procedure.     
The figure below illustrates the transition from the pre-fee to post-fee  NAV,  where  
NAV(t)  denotes the reported post-fee  NAV  at the end of period t.  NAV(t)*  denotes the 
associated pre-fee  NAV  at the end of the period  t. 
  The reported post-fee return captures the change of the reported  NAV  from  NAV(1)  to  
NAV(2),  indicated by the dash-dot line.  The pre-fee return changes from the pre-fee  NAV(1)*  
less the management fee (that is, equivalent to the reported  NAV(1)  plus the incentive fee at 
time 1) to  NAV(2)*.  The reconstructed  NAV(2)*  is the sum of the reported  NAV(2), the 
accrued incentive fee at time 2, denoted as  IF(2),  and the management fee  MF(2).  The 
incentive fee base at each time is the difference between the  NAV  less the management fee and 
the high-water-mark  (HWM).  
 Thus, the total gross return for the period (1 + RGROSSt) can be expressed as follows:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )1
( 1) ( 1)tGROSS
NAV t IF t MF tR
NAV t IF t
+ ++ = − + −                                          (A1) 
 
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( 1)
( 1) ( 1)tGROSS
NAV t NAV t MF t IF t IF tR
NAV t IF t
− − + + − −= − + −                       (A2) 
 
22 
 
Figure A1. Pre-Fee vs. Post-fee Net Asset Value 
The figure illustrates the transformation of the pre-fee returns to the post-fee returns.  The 
horizontal axis indicates time periods during which returns are accumulated.  At the end of each 
period, a new net asset value  (NAV)  is computed.  The  NAVs  are marked on the vertical axis.  
NAV(t)  stands for the reported post-fee  NAV  at the end of period t.  NAV(t)*   stands for the 
associated pre-fee  NAV at the same time.  Solid black lines indicate the pre-fee  NAV  change 
within a given period.  The dash-dotted line indicates the change in reported post-fee  NAV  
within the same period.  Reported  NAV  at the end of a period is obtain by subtracting from the 
pre-fee  NAV  the management fee  MF(t)  and the incentive fee  IF(t).  The incentive fee is zero, 
if the pre-fee  NAV  less the management fee is below the high-water mark  HWM.  Otherwise it 
is computed as a share of a difference between the pre-fee  NAV  less the management fee and 
the  HWM.  
 
0 1 2
HWM
NAV(1)=NAV(1)*-MF(1)-IF(1)
NAV(1)*-MF(1)
NAV(1)*
NAV(2)=NAV(2)*-MF(2)-IF(2)
NAV(2)*-MF(2)
NAV(2)*
Time
Incentive fee
base
 
 
 If a hedge fund is above  HWM  at time  t  based on its post management fee  NAV, it will 
stay above  HWM  after paying the percentage incentive fee.  Denoting the percentage incentive 
fee by  IncentiveFee%, we obtain: 
 
( )max(0, ( ) ) (1 %) max(0, ( ) ) ( )NAV t HWM IncentiveFee NAV t HWM IF t− = − ⋅ − + ,      (A3) 
 
This leads to the following expression for the accrued incentive fee at time t: 
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1( ) max(0, ( ) ) 1
1 %
IF t NAV t HWM
IncentiveFee
⎛ ⎞= − ⋅ −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠                           (A4) 
 
 Similarly, the reported  NAV  plus the accrued incentive fee (if any) is a fraction of the 
total  NAV*  equal to the total  NAV*  minus the management fee.  Thus, if the yearly 
management fee expressed in percentage terms is  MgmtFee%, we obtain: 
 
( ) %( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
12
MgmtFeeNAV t MF t IF t NAV t IF t⎛ ⎞+ + ⋅ − = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , 
 
The management fee actually paid can be expressed as: 
 
 ( ) 1( ) ( ) ( ) 1%1
12
MF t NAV t IF t MgmtFee
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= + ⋅ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
                       (A5) 
 
If at year’s end,  NAV  exceeds  HWM,  the new  HWM  for the next year is reset to the level of 
the post-fee  NAV;  and the accrued incentive fee is reset to zero. 
Under different assumptions on the exact timing of computing and paying the 
management fee, one can obtain a slightly different specification of equation (A5).  For example, 
Brooks, Clare, and Motson (2007) seem to assume that the management fee, although paid at the 
end of the month, is computed based on the NAV at the beginning of the month.  Thus, they 
obtain the following expression for the management fee, which introduces only negligible 
differences in the resulting pre-fee returns:11        
 
                   1( ) ( 1) 1%1
12
MF t NAV t MgmtFee
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − ⋅ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
                                        (A5’)
 
                                                 
11 Equation (A5’) corresponds to equation (7) in Brooks, Clare, and Motson (2007), where they denote management 
fee paid at time  t  (MF(t)  in our version) by  MgtFeet. 
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